Accessing other people’s technology for non-profit research by Nottenburg, Carol et al.
Accessing other people’s technology
for non-proﬁt research*
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
As patents and other forms of intellectual property become more pervasive in the next
generation of biotechnologies, designing policies and practices to ensure suﬃcient
freedom to operate (i.e., the ability to practice or use an innovation) will be crucial for
non-proﬁt research agencies, especially those intent on developing technologies
destinedforcommercialrelease.Arenon-proﬁtorganisationsexemptfromintellectual
property claims? What constitutes infringement of a patent? How does a non-proﬁt
establish its freedom to operate? We address these issues in this paper and evaluate
various options for accessing other people’s technologies. Options include cross-
licensing agreements, research-only or cost-free licences, market segmentation
strategies,mergersorjointventures,andpatentpoolingorclearinghousemechanisms.
Responding creatively to the new intellectual property environment will have far
reaching consequences for the future of non-proﬁt research.
1. Introduction
Interest in intellectual property no longer belongs just to the private-sector
realm of inventors, authors, artists and the ﬁrms that deal in their output.
Public and private non-proﬁt institutions around the world are becoming
increasinglyevidentontheintellectualpropertyscene,interactingmoreclosely
with the for-proﬁt sector and even spawning private entities of their own.
Among non-proﬁt entities, universities have traditionally been considered
ivory-tower institutions and bastions of pure academic pursuits, however,
they are becoming increasingly active in claims for patents, copyrights
and other forms of intellectual properties. For example, from the years
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rights to entities containing the word University in its name, comprising
only 0.59 per cent of total USA patents during these years. From 1986 to
1990, this number increased to 4027 or 0.96 per cent; from 1991 to 1995, 7314
or 1.47 per cent; and from 1996 to 2000, 13 940 or 2.15 per cent of total
patents awarded. At least some of this increase may be attributed to the
Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, which mandated that USA government cede
ownership of intellectual property emanating from government-sponsored
research to the recipient institution (Mowery et al. 2001). Notably absent
from the set of non-proﬁt institutes that seek patent protection are the
Centres that form the Consultative Group on International Agriculture
Research (CGIAR, or CG for short). Of these 16 Centres, located primarily
in developing countries, only a few have obtained patent protection for their
inventions (Binenbaum et al. 2001).
Non-proﬁt institutions are not generally in the business of selling products
to consumers. If they are to realise a return on their investment (rather than
make it available gratis), they essentially have to sell rights to their
technologies to commercial entities or other research institutions. For
example, the technologies may be exclusively out-licensed to a commercial
partner or form the basis for a company that is spun oﬀ from the institute.
Alternatively, an institution may choose to out-license the technology itself
on a non-exclusive basis. Some highly publicised patents have been licensed
in this manner, generating a very substantial income for the host institution.
For example, in 1997, Stanford University received over $43 million from
licensing the now-expired Boyer-Cohen patent claiming basic recombinant
DNA technology, which represented over half of its total licensing income.
Non-proﬁts also receive substantial funding from the private commercial
sector. This money may or may not be encumbered with intellectual property
constraints, such as an obligation to license or assign resulting technology
and inventions back to the funding agency.
For all these beneﬁts that non-proﬁt institutions receive from intellectual
property, these same institutes are notorious for using other people’s
patented technologies without permission. Despite widespread belief to the
contrary, however, non-proﬁt organisations are not immune to intellectual
property laws. There is no general research exemption from infringement,
and the exemptions in the USA, for example, are very limited and based in
statutes.
1 With a special emphasis on agricultural biotechnology, this article
discusses policies of intellectual property protection, de jure and de facto
1 One notable exception is that State institutions in the USA cannot be sued in Federal
courts. Very likely, the USA Congress will ﬁnd a constitutionally acceptable means of
correcting the anomaly that allows State institutions to enjoy the beneﬁts of the patent system
but not the consequences.
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with or is at odds with these policies and exemptions. We consider the
consequences of intellectual property on the freedom to operate (i.e.,
accessing and using others’ research) from a non-proﬁt perspective, present
an overview of the steps necessary to abide by others’ intellectual property
rights, and show how most non-proﬁts are ill-equipped to undertake such
measures. Ignorance or inaction by a non-proﬁt leading to infringement of
other people’s intellectual property rights is risky; assessment of the risks is
discussed below. Finally, we present strategies for pursuing diﬀerent options
of obtaining rights to use other people’s technologies with special emphasis
on the international implications of these issues.
2. Forms of intellectual property protection
Over the past few decades, there has been a proliferation of intellectual
property emanating from agricultural technologies and the sciences that
generate these technologies. The major forms of legal protection available for
agricultural biotechnology are patents, Plant Breeders’ Rights, trademarks,
trade secrets and contracts. Third-party trademarks and trade secrets,
however, have relatively little impact on research performed in non-proﬁt
institutions and so will not be discussed here. Plant Breeders’ Rights in most
jurisdictions contain a research exemption and, thus, are not discussed
further. Protecting and controlling the use of intellectual property can also be
achieved by technical means, like hybridisation of crops such as corn and
rice, and genetic use restriction technologies (GURTs). These methods have
the greatest impact on farmers by rendering the seed unsuitable for replanting
or suppressing the expression of certain introduced traits in saved seed. They
are not discussed here, but are dealt with in detail by UNEP⁄CBD⁄SBSTTA
(1999).
A web of proprietary claims now envelops the transfer and use of patented
biotechnologies, thereby limiting the freedom to operate of public and
private agencies alike. Biotechnologies covered by these claims include:
1. Parent germplasm in the form of individual plant varieties,
2. Germplasm constructs that include trait-speciﬁc genes controlling speciﬁc
input characteristics such as tolerance of biotic and abiotic stresses,
output traits such as increased content of starch, oil, amino acids, pro-
teins, vitamins, and minerals, or decreased content of traits that are
harmful (for example, allergens) or contribute to environmental pollution
(such as phytates in manure), and
3. Enabling technologies that include methods of transformation of plant
cells by insertion of a gene coding for a speciﬁc characteristic into plant
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genes serving as selectable markers to determine which plant cells have
been successfully transformed, and gene silencing or regulating technol-
ogies that can be used to suppress or modify gene expression in plants.
Depending on the complexity of the transgenic product, there can be dozens
of identiﬁable proprietary claims involved in its development.
A basic understanding of the nature of intellectual property inherent in a
patent is a prerequisite to thinking about the appropriate public research and
development (R&D) role in an increasingly proprietary agricultural science
world. Patents protect inventions of tangible things and confer a legally
enforceable right on their owners to exclude others from practising the
invention described and claimed in the document. Utility patents on
inventions related to machinery, chemicals and pharmaceuticals have been
around for centuries. By early 2001, 111 countries with their own patent
systems were signatories to the Patent Cooperation Treaty administered by
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) headquartered in
Geneva. What is comparatively new, however, is the broadening of the scope
of the protection to include inventions involving living things. In Australia,
there are two ways of claiming protection for plants: utility patents and Plant
Breeders Rights. Patentable subject matter includes new plant varieties,
genetically modiﬁed plants, plant components and reproductive parts.
Generally, similar protection for plants is provided in the USA. In addition,
Plant Patents are available for asexually reproduced plants and Plant Variety
Protection Certiﬁcates for asexually reproduced plants. The expansion of
meanstoprotectplantsmaybeobservedaswellinEurope.Plantsdistinguished
by a single recombinant DNA sequence (as distinct from plant varieties per se)
are now patentable in European countries, according to a decision of the
European Board of Patent Review (Harbison and Wailes 2000).
Patent rights apply only for a limited period of time, generally 20 years
from the date of ﬁling, and only in a speciﬁc legal jurisdiction, and the scope
of the property protection is circumscribed by the claims made in the patent.
Especially in the USA, the validity of a patent, and its scope, is often unclear
until many years after issue, when ﬁnal legal rulings are issued after a court
challenge.
A common misconception is that patents are international in scope.
However, patents are awarded by national governments and the intellectual
protection conferred by a patent extends only to the national jurisdiction in
which the patent is awarded. If an innovation is patented in Australia but not
in, for example, China, then anyone is free to use it in China, although
importation into Australia of a product embodying the patented IP, or
resulting from it, might well be subject to legal challenge. The nature of
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greater detail in Binenbaum et al. (2000).
The cost of obtaining a patent varies from country to country; the cost of
obtaining protection in all important markets can amount to hundreds of
thousands of dollars. Thus, most inventions are patented in just one or a few
developed countries with large markets; the chance that many of these
patents have been awarded in developing countries is small.
2
While we focus on the implications of intellectual property protected by
patents (and related commercial contracts and licences) for freedom to
operate by researchers at non-proﬁt institutions, it is important to remember
that access to intellectual property is shaped by the interactions among all
available forms of intellectual property protection (including trade secrets
and contracts, discussed brieﬂy in this context by Binenbaum et al. 2000).
3. Do you need permission to use other people’s technology?
The nature of the patent right allows the patent holder to exclude others from
making, using, selling, oﬀering for sale or importing the patented invention.
The principal public policy rationale for patent rights is that they provide
direct socially beneﬁcial incentives to innovate as well as facilitate further
innovation by mandating public disclosure of the patented technology.
Inherent in this scheme, however, is a tension between the goal of providing
incentives for innovation and the goal of allowing innovators to build upon
one another’s work. Recognising that it is desirable to allow use of patented
processes and products for basic research purposes, some countries sought to
facilitate access and provide researchers some level of certainty of avoiding
an infringement suit. Among the means they have chosen are statutory
exemptions, common law (judicially fashioned) exemptions, and compulsory
licensing. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the merits and
disadvantages of each of these approaches. Rather, to illustrate research
access issues in concrete terms, the following discussion primarily presents
the situation in Australia and the USA, which arguably have only a common
law exemption. This is in direct contrast to the situation in Europe, which has
an explicit research exemption.
3 As more countries implement patent laws
and engage in more basic research, the debate will widen over research
exemptions in relationship to patent rights. In the discussion below, we point
out some possible ways in which exemptions can be modiﬁed, subverted or
overridden.
2 In 1998, the number of patents granted in the USA, Europe and Japan accounted for
about 80 per cent of the world’s patents (USPTO 1999).
3 European Patent Convention Draft, Article 27(B).
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The right to use a patented invention for research is a concern in both non-
proﬁt and commercial settings. The impression is that many, if not most,
scientists in the public sector assume that patent law does not apply to their
basic research. In Australia, where a sizeable share of the R&D funding for
the Commonwealth Scientiﬁc and Industrial Research Organisation
(CSIRO), State Departments of Agriculture, and universities emanates from
statutory corporations seeking to fund research that ultimately will result in
commercialisation, grant applicants are asked for a statement about
intellectual property considerations (e.g., freedom to operate for the proposed
research). Moreover, these statutory corporations generally retain some share
of ownership over resulting intellectual property. In contrast, governmental
granting agencies and foundations in the USA rarely, if ever, claim ownership
of inventions that result from research they fund
4 and do not solicit
information from the applicant as to whether their research will use patented
technologies. Thus, academic researchers are often shocked to discover that,
except for some very limited statutory exemptions that do not generally apply
to them, there is no general research exemption in either Australia or the USA
for using other people’s patented technologies.
5
In the course of the development of patent law in the USA, courts have
faced the issue of examining whether there is a research or experimental use
exemption. Many of the cases involved infringement actions against the USA
Government, where there is a clear absence of a proﬁt motive for using the
patented inventions. Overall, when the Government uses an invention during
its normal activities, even though the activities are non-commercial, it
infringes.
6 As a rule, the USA Federal Circuit court, or its predecessor court,
only has found exemptions when use was for idle curiosity or purely
philosophical pursuits. So, for example, a university researcher’s use of
polymerase chain reaction (PCR) to assist in cloning a plant gene would
require a licence from the patentee owning rights to PCR. It is possible,
however, that use of PCR in educational activities might escape a ﬁnding of
infringement (Parker and Staﬀord 1998).
4 Funding for non-proﬁts and small business concerns is made by the Government on the
proviso that it retains rights to use any resulting inventions. These rights are non-transferable,
non-exclusive and irrevocable. 35 U.S.C. §200 et seq. implements the Bayh-Dole Act and
amendments. For speciﬁc wording of Government rights, see 37 C.F.R. §401.14.
5 In contrast to patents, Plant Breeders Rights provide for a research exemption. A pro-
tected variety may be used and reproduced in plant breeding or other bona ﬁde research. The
UPOV Convention, and most if not all of the countries that are signatories to that convention,
have a similar exemption.
6 Pitcairn v United States, 547 F.2d 1106 (Ct. Cl. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1051 (1978).
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infringement. These include, use in or on foreign vessels, aircraft or vehicles
(§118) and prior use (§119). General legal theory of statutory language
suggests that the lack of an explicit research exemption in the Patents Act
means that there is no exemption. The USA Congress has the authority to
legislate a general research use exemption, but so far has only enacted a few
very narrow exemptions that cover drug testing required for government
approval
7 and for medical practitioners.
8 While many commentators favour
a more expansive research use exemption, legislatures have failed to act.
A policy consideration that would drive enactment of such an exemption
would likely be based on a need for the exemption in order to promote
continued innovation or to remove university and non-proﬁt research
institutions from the risk of infringement actions. Even if there was a
demonstrated need for an exemption, workability of an exemption could be
extremely diﬃcult given the often poor distinction between pure (non-
commercial) research and research with a commercial interest in non-proﬁt
organisations. This particular issue is discussed in more detail below.
In jurisdictions that have adopted research exemptions, the exceptions are
usually limited to research on improvements of the invention and do not
extend to use of the invention in research. For example, in Europe, the
Community Patent Convention provides a research exemption relating to
EuropeanCommunitypatents:patentprotectiondoesnotextendtoactsdone
privately and for non-commercial purposes and acts done for experimental
purposes relating to the subject matter of the patented invention.
9
Even assuming that absolutely no research exemption exists, it is
unlikely, however, that non-proﬁt organisations have more than a very
minor risk of infringement exposure.
10 It would be poor public relations for
7 35 USC §271(e)(1): It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, or sell a patented
invention … solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of infor-
mation under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use or sale of drugs or veterinary
biological products. However, use of patented herbicides to test new herbicide-tolerant cul-
tivars, for example, would not fall within this exemption.
8 35 USC §287 (g)(1) granting an exemption for use of patented medical or surgical pro-
cedures.
9 European Patent Convention Draft, Article 27(B). Individual European Countries such as
Germany, UK, France, Switzerland, Sweden, the Netherlands and Italy have enacted laws
granting research exemptions, many with similar language to EPC 27(B). Interpretations of
these laws indicate that the exemption would be restricted to research relating to invention,
and would not encompass research using the invention.
10 This opinion is limited to patent rights. Recently, universities have been subject to
accusations of copyright infringement in the highly publicised Napster case. See The Standard
(2000).
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it is likely that a jury would sympathise with the defendant. In addition,
the type of remedy imposed is unlikely to be severe from the institute’s
point of view. In Roche Products v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co.,
11 a key
experimental use exemption case, the patent owner urged that the data
generated during the infringing activity be conﬁscated and destroyed. The
Court, however, expressed a preference for monetary damages and
admonished that injunctions are an equitable remedy and by no means a
mandatory remedy. Although diﬃcult to predict with certainty, damages
owed by a non-proﬁt infringer would likely be limited, possibly to the cost
of a licence, as use of the technology within a non-proﬁt organisation
would not generally cause a company to lose proﬁts.
12 Thus, weighed
against the signiﬁcant expenses of litigation, a corporation is unlikely to
pursue such a suit except for very signiﬁcant matters. Furthermore,
patentee corporations stand to gain some advantages by having researchers
do some of their research and widely adopt technologies that the
corporation can then licence. For example, CAMBIA (Centre for the
Application of Molecular Biology to International Agriculture) owns rights
to b-glucuronidase (GUS), which was widely used by researchers in non-
proﬁt organisations who ultimately moved to corporations and continued
using GUS. While CAMBIA grants non-commercial research in non-proﬁt
settings a cost-free licence, fees are charged for using GUS in commercial
research.
13
In actuality, one might reasonably argue that there is a de facto research
exemption for non-proﬁt organisations in the USA. The number of patent
suits ﬁled in USA District Courts against non-proﬁt organisations is
extremely small. Thus, although there is no statutory research exemption
for most non-proﬁt institutions, it is unlikely that infringement suits will
be ﬁled against universities and research institutes regardless of their
geographical location, in cases where the nature of the research is clearly
non-commercial.
11 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 USA 856 (1984).
12 Infringement can be very costly in Australia, where the loser must pay legal fees of the
winner, and in the USA, where willful infringement can invoke treble damages.
13 CAMBIA is a private non-proﬁt organisation that relies on revenue from licensing its
own technologies as well as grant funding. While its main thrust is developing enabling
technologies for agricultural research and development, CAMBIA has also launched an
internet-based resource on intellectual property that is designed to assist the user in under-
standing patents and integrating them with business strategy.
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While the risk of infringement liability appears to be essentially nil for non-
proﬁt organisations doing non-commercial research, it is the opinion of the
authors that the risk may be higher when commercially-orientated research
or services are performed. In these situations, the organisation may receive a
cease-and-desist letter, an oﬀer for a commercial licence, or notice of an
infringement action.
Commercial services performed by a non-proﬁt organisation may well
attract unwanted attention from a patent holder. For example, in Florida
Prepaid, the alleged infringer, an entity created by the State of Florida that
administers tuition prepayment contracts, was sued by College Savings Bank
for direct and indirect infringement of its patent, and several years ago the
holder of PCR patent rights contacted a prominent non-proﬁt cancer
research institute about a commercial licence for use of PCR to tissue type
patients, a service for which the institute charged.
14 Thus, activities that have
a commercial aspect may provoke patent rights holders to take some sort of
action against even non-proﬁt institutions.
But what exactly is commercial research performed by non-proﬁt organi-
sations?Andwhereisthelinedrawnbetweencommercialandnon-commercial
research? Some commentators broadly deﬁne commercial research as research
havingsomecommercialpurpose,butinsomesensethisisacirculardeﬁnition.
Trying instead to deﬁne non-commercial research leads to similar diﬃculties.
Indeed, an increasing amount of research is performed as part of a private-
public sector alliance. In the year 2000, at the University of California at
Berkeley,sevenpercent($14millionoutofatotalof$170million)ofexternally
fundedresearchprojectsforresearch, education,andpublicservice wereinthe
form of grants of contracts from private industry (University of California
2000). In 1999, industry awarded $35 million out of a total of $136 million
(26 per cent) (University of California 1999). Much of the increase in 1999 was
duetoasinglecorporatesponsorshipatUCBerkeleythatconstitutedover$25
million of funding for a 5-year period. This alliance between Novartis
Agricultural Discovery Institute and the Department of Plant and Microbial
Biology has been highly publicised and much criticised (e.g., Press and
Washburn 2000). Some aspects of the agreement are discussed below.
3.3 What is ‘free access’?
Given that there is some risk to using other people’s patented technologies,
some in the non-proﬁt research world may want express permission to use the
technologies. As discussed in detail below, permission may be obtained in a
14 Personal communication to one of the authors.
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access. Sometimes agreements widely characterised as onerous, such as the
Novartis-Berkeley deal, are far less restrictive than many apparently free
deals and traditional consulting arrangements with academics. For example,
access to Monsanto’s (Pharmacia) rice genome sequence database has
multiple restrictions. It is limited to publicly funded research at non-proﬁt
research organisations and government research agencies, data downloads
are limited to the amount of data submitted up to 26 kb per request (thereby
severely curtailing the applications or research possibilities with these data),
and any resulting intellectual property, although vesting in the institution,
must be reported to Pharmacia along with a copy of the patent ﬁling.
Furthermore, the institution must grant Pharmacia a right to negotiate a
non-exclusive licence and agree that Pharmacia may use the research results
in its internal programs.
In consulting arrangements with individual faculty, private funders
typically retain complete control over the nature of funded research and
any resulting patents, and may constrain the publication of results adverse to
the funders’ interests. Frequently, research reagents such as cell lines, vectors,
and clones are transferred between investigators by material transfer
agreements (MTA). The form of an MTA can range from a formal document
setting out the conditions of transfer to a simple letter accompanying the
reagent that states conditions for acceptance. In the academic world, MTAs
commonly specify that the materials are not to be transferred to third parties,
and may also specify sharing of results obtained using the material, particular
acknowledgement in publication, or even co-authorship. We are aware of
cases in which the sender of the material was not the originator of the material
but still attempted to impose conditions on its transfer.
Furthermore, because the vast preponderance of investigators in the
USA as well as many other countries are obliged to assign all property rights
to the host institutions, we question the validity of a MTA signed only by the
sender or approved only by the recipient investigator. From a legal
viewpoint, it is unclear whether an investigator alone has the authority to
agree to conditions of material transfer either in or out of his or her
institution. Pragmatically, a cautious approach is to have an oﬃcial of the
institution sign the MTA in addition to the investigator. That approach, by
avoiding unwanted diﬃculties in the future, might well lower the overall
transaction costs in the long run.
4. Determining freedom to operate
Even though the risk of serious consequences for infringement in a non-proﬁt
institution is currently quite low, as research becomes more and more
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increases, the need to scope out the intellectual property landscape will
become more pressing. Who will have, or ought to have, responsibility for
determining freedom to operate (FTO) is an issue itself that is beyond the
scope of this discussion. In Australia, some government-supported Research
and Development Corporations require a grant seeker to discuss FTO as part
of the application process. In this situation the onus is placed on the
investigator, a person typically ill-equipped to perform the analysis and
without funding to hire an attorney or a patent search company. In the
current environment, however, many institutions are also ill-equipped to
analyse FTO issues.
Determining FTO can be a costly task if the analysis is referred to a lawyer.
For the non-legal professional, performing an FTO analysis can be daunting
due to the dynamic nature of patents, diﬃculties in claim interpretation, the
cumulative nature of biotechnologies, diﬃculty of searching patent literature
and lack of in-house infrastructure. We discuss each of these challenges.
If these approaches for determining FTO are not appealing, then some of
the alternatives outlined in Section 5 of this article might be worth
considering.
Any FTO analysis is, by its design, a snapshot of the current patent
situation. However, producing, patenting and disclosing inventions is a
dynamic process. For most FTO analyses, review of emerging patent
publications is an integral part of the analysis because there is a continuous
stream of patents and applications being published. In addition, new
inventors enter an area and those already in the ﬁeld add to their own
intellectual property. For example, in 1996, a FTO analysis was performed
by one of us for a small start-up biotech company in the USA. At that
time, there were only a few players in the ﬁeld, with one or two likely to
emerge with the predominant rights. Less than a year later, an update of the
analysis revealed an extremely crowded ﬁeld with many players and
unfortunately, for the client, additional prior art that anticipated some of
its patent claims.
Complicating the challenges imposed by a changing landscape is the
diﬃculty of determining what entity will triumph with what claims. The ﬁrst
view of most patent-type intellectual property is as a publication of a pending
application.
15 A pending application has claims but they have not been
examined or approved by any Patent Oﬃce. Often the published claims are
unrealistic compared with the scope that will ultimately be granted.
15 Until 29 November 2000, the USA published only issued patents. At that date, the USA
began to publish patent applications 18 months after the earliest priority date, except in
limited circumstances when no non-USA patents have been applied for and the applicant
petitions for non-publication.
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lengthy procedure. Of course, until grant there cannot be infringement. That
said, when a product is important it is not necessarily a good idea to wait
until grant to try to license or design around the patent.
4.1 Interpretation of claims
The claims of a patent, and not the text, deﬁne the metes and bounds of the
patent right conferred on the patentee. The invention as written in the
speciﬁcation of the patent does not establish the extent of the right. For many
reasons the claims as granted may not fully cover what is written in the body
of the patent.
16 To delineate the extent of the right, claims must be
interpreted. Although claims should be interpreted according to the law of
the jurisdiction, some basic commonalities apply. For the purposes of this
discussion, we refer to USA patent law recognising that many of the key
details also hold for other jurisdictions, including Australia.
In the USA, claim construction is a matter of law
17 and is focused on an
objective test of what one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the
invention would have understood the term to mean. In the USA, claim
scope is established by three factors: the plain language of the claim; the
speciﬁcation (text of the patent); and the prosecution history.
18 While the
speciﬁcation acts as sort of a dictionary, prosecution history is also used to
determine the true meaning of the claims, and the use of extrinsic evidence
to aid claim construction is discretionary. Therefore, a proper claim
interpretation requires skill in reading claims, speciﬁcation, and prosecution
history.
Infringement is determined by examining whether the alleged infringing
product or method falls within the scope of the claims. Even if there is no
literal infringement, there may still be infringement under the judicially-
created doctrine of equivalents. This overlay of doctrine of equivalents,
which is present in some form in major jurisdictions (e.g., USA, Australia,
Japan and Europe) increases the diﬃculty of ﬁrmly determining FTO.
Very recently, however, in the USA, the Federal Circuit appeals court, which
16 During the examination of a patent application, the applicant may need to cancel or
amend the submitted claims to ensure patentability. In addition, some claims may need to be
moved to a new application because otherwise there would be multiple inventions in a single
application.
17 As a matter of law, judges, and not juries, determine the meaning of a claim. See also
Markman et al. v. Westview Instruments, Inc et al. 517 USA 370 (1996).
18 The negotiation between the Patent Oﬃce and the applicant is called prosecution. The
record of this negotiation is called prosecution history.
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has severely limited the scope of the doctrine of equivalents.
19 The USA
Supreme Court is currently considering this holding, but, at least for now,
analyses that consider only literal infringement will aﬀord a fair amount of
certainty.
4.2 Cumulative nature of biotechnologies
The development of any product in biotechnology requires a multitude of
technologiesandreagents.Thisisespeciallytrueinagriculturalbiotechnology,
wherethedeliverysystemincludesgermplasm(usuallyseeds,whichthemselves
embody the results of previous generations of research). Typical reagents
include vectors for transformation of plants, components of vectors (e.g.,
promoters, selectable markers), elite plant varieties and the like. Methodol-
ogies necessary for research and development include transformation of plant
cells. Because of its high proﬁle, freedom-to-operate was analysed for
GoldenRice
TM, rice that produces a vitamin A precursor as a result of
transformation with non-rice genes (Kryder et al. 2000). The analysis
estimated that 70 patented technologies were used during research and
development. Although the number of these that is needed to actually practise
GoldenRice is certainly somewhat less, even in the USA (where 44 of the total
of 70 patents apply) and major European countries where the relevant
technologies are most frequently patented, this analysis illustrates the
complexity of intellectual property in agricultural biotechnology.
4.3 Tools for searching patents and applications
In addition to an FTO assessment, scientists and other researchers may want
to examine patents as a source of scientiﬁc information. Because companies
do not always publish results of research that leads to patents in conventional
journals, patents and published applications are a rich source of information
on data and methods. But how and where does a non-legal professional come
by the information?
Several databases
20 that contain diﬀering amounts of information are
available by Internet access; some are by paid subscription and some are at
19 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
cert. granted 121 S. Ct. 2519 (2001).
20 A non-inclusive list of databases includes: CAMBIA (www.cambiaIP.org); USA Patent
and Trademark Oﬃce <www.uspto.gov>; Delphion Network <www.delphion.com>;
Yet2<www.yet2.com>;EuropeanPatentOﬃce<ep.dips.org>;Dialog<www.dialog.com>;
Micropatent <www.micropatent.com> and STN International <www.ﬁz-karlsruhe.de>.
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databases is the interface, which caters to individuals with expertise in
intellectual property. Another issue is the limited number of searchable ﬁelds.
Unlike the indexed scientiﬁc literature at the National Library of Medicine,
patent publications are not indexed, forcing a text-based search. While many
would not be put oﬀ by the need for a text-based search strategy, the
language used in writing patents is very stylistic and to some extent codiﬁed
by the drafters. A patent title may bear faint resemblance to the subject
matter. For example, many published patent applications lodged at the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) oﬃce bear the title
Secreted human proteins. Furthermore, with the exception of the CAMBIA
database, none provide an explanation about patents, how to read a patent,
or other information to assist the naı¨ve user.
4.4 Infrastructure in non-proﬁt institutions
An additional hurdle for non-proﬁt organisations and their investigators is
the lack of in-house infrastructure. Technology transfer oﬃces appear mostly
to be staﬀed by individuals whose job it is to out-license technology and raise
money for the host institution. A perusal of the staﬀ directory of these oﬃces
reveals very few patent attorneys. As with most administrative departments,
these oﬃces operate on a limited budget. It is unlikely that many will have the
necessary resources to perform or contract for detailed freedom-to-operate
analyses.
5. Options for accessing other people’s technology
There are various options for gaining access to proprietary technologies.
Some of the more important ones are discussed here, mainly from the
perspective of a non-proﬁt agency. Some emphasis is given to those operating
in less-developed countries, although most of the issues discussed are relevant
in rich countries too.
5.1 Cross licensing
This is a popular solution for deals among biotech oligopolists. Australia is
typical and instructive. We discovered that research capacity alone was not
enough. Research concepts and unpublished data were sometimes interesting
for our Industry Associates, but developing collaborative projects based on
them was diﬃcult. The breakthrough came when the CRC for Plant Science
started to take out patents. Patents are property; property is valuable (or so
prevailing wisdom then suggested), and therefore it can be traded. It was as if
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our feet under the card table. It was then that the tactic of progressive
engagement started to pay oﬀ (Buller and Taylor 1999). Similarly, when the
Crop Development Center of the University of Saskatchewan developed a
commercially viable transgenic ﬂaxcultivar, its possession of a USA patent
on a biolistic transformation process for ﬂaxwas reportedly important for
negotiations to obtain freedom to operate (Stovin and Phillips 2000, p. 687).
In universities, cross licensing is often precluded by the nature of contracts
for compensation of university innovators. In contrast to most USA corpo-
rations, USA universities generally have established rules that grant a
substantial share of licensing revenues to their employees who patent
valuable innovations, and other universities in other OECD countries are
following their lead.
21 Many other public and non-proﬁt institutions have
similar rules. (See, for example, Phillips and Gustafson 2000, table 13 p. 72,
for a dramatic contrast between for-proﬁt and public biotech research
institutions in Saskatchewan, Canada.)
The CGIAR does have some possible bargaining chips, including its
goodwill, access to local institutions involved in the generation and transfer
of technologies, and non-designated germplasm, in the form of breeding lines
and other material not designated as freely-available under the 1994 FAO
Trust Agreement having traits with potential value in commercial markets.
22
The latter are signiﬁcant only for the major crops that have been subject to
intensive breeding eﬀorts.
In an example of cross-licensing by non-proﬁts, the near-isogenic lines of
rice germplasm developed at the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI)
headquartered in the Philippines, potentially useful in plant breeding, are
examples of technology that might be licensed via a Material Transfer
Agreement (MTA) or other contractual agreement. Fischer et al. (2000)
propose a model MTA that oﬀers such material at no cost in exchange for
access to information about subsequent discoveries (after a lag to allow
applications for patents), and zero-cost non-exclusive research licences to
Centres of the CGIAR and agricultural research agencies operating in less-
developed countries (LDC). Further, they propose that a non-exclusive
licence for commercialisation shall be granted to the research centres at a
21 Normile (1998) describes changes in Japanese patent law that increase the possible
rewards for university inventors and relaxthe grace period for publication.
22 The nearly 670 000 accessions of crop and tree species conserved in the 11 genebanks of
CGIAR do not constitute the set of bargaining chips or negotiating assets that Byerlee and
Fischer 2001 and others seem to suggest. Since 1994 the CGIAR Centres have undertaken to
make most of this material, approximately 520 000 accessions, freely available to all by way of
an in-trust agreement with the United Nation’s FAO, eﬀectively taking it out of contention as
a basis for bargaining with the private sector.
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not in competition with the private sector. Whether such initiatives can be
pursued successfully at suﬃciently low cost in money and managerial
resources is an open question.
If the above example leads to successful cross licensing, it is likely to be the
exception that proves the rule. The number and value of intellectual property
chips held by most public agencies operating in or for LDC (and particularly
those operating in the poorer parts of the developing world) that might
provide a basis for bargaining with the private sector is often overstated. For
example, in 1998 the CG Centres collectively spent an estimated $25 million
on biotechnology research (Morris and Hoisington 2000) and held few
patents (probably less than 10 in total, and most were neither related to
biotechnologies nor granted in developed-country jurisdictions). Contrast
this with Monsanto who spent $1263 million on R&D that same year and
was granted a total of 437 patents during the 5 years between 1994 and 1998.
For public research organisations that are acting independently, cross
licensing tends to be much more a part of the problem than of the solution.
As the agricultural biotech industry matures, it is becoming like many other
industries where each major participant holds an IP portfolio, much of
which is regularly infringed by competitors. But none usually bring suit
because each knows that the defendant would respond with a counterattack
based on those of the defendants patents that it is infringing. Litigation is too
much like a nuclear weapon, and the relation becomes one of mutual assured
destruction. But, there is no reason not to use the portfolio against possible
new entrants who might aﬀect the oligopoly rents available to the industry
leaders’ (Barton 2000, p. 8). Public or non-proﬁt researchers might well ﬁnd
themselves, like potential private entrants, shut out by the oligopoly defended
by cross-licensing agreements.
5.2 Research only licences and their pitfalls
For scientists, research-only licences might be attractive, as they allow them
to pursue their intellectual interests using state-of-the-art technology.
Furthermore, a research license might generate externalities to the licensee
in the form of learning-by-doing, and more generally, the development of
intangible research capacities that might reduce future dependence on
proprietary technology.
However, a free research licence that does not permit commercialisation
can make a research tool the cuckoos egg’ of technology transfer. If the
project succeeds, then the bargaining for permission to commercialise (or
release to users at no cost) the fruits of the research eﬀort must begin. The
fact that the researchers have already incurred the sunk cost of all the
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position. On the other hand, the holder of the intellectual property right, even
if it refuses to allow commercialisation, gains information about the
technology and its downstream applications that it can use for its own
purposes.
In some circumstances the situation might be more favourable to the
licensee. If dissemination of successful innovations based on proprietary
technology to users in certain markets oﬀers little commercial beneﬁt, a
private licensor might be persuaded to license such dissemination gratis to a
licensee with non-commercial objectives (for example, elimination of hunger
among the poor) if it sees some kind of beneﬁt, such as an enhanced public
image, from doing so. This is discussed further below.
5.3 Market segmentation strategies
Before discussion of this strategy in detail, it is crucial to emphasise that this
is not a passive strategy. Rather, it entails devotion of substantial high-
quality resources for successful implementation.
A survey by Cohen et al. (1998) caused some concern when it revealed that
CG Centres are already using research tools and other inputs that are subject
to intellectual property rights. What was not obvious from the survey was
how many of these were subject to intellectual property in the locations in
which Centres operate. All the Centres engaged in biological research are in
less-developed economies. Indeed, until recently, few developing countries
allowed patents on life forms. In many cases, research tools and genetic
material, and especially plant cultivars, are not covered by patents in the host
countries of international centres. As already noted, patents usually are ﬁled
in, at most, a select group of countries.
23 Where no patents are held, there can
be no infringement.
To the extent that research agencies use technologies and cultivars that are
not patented or otherwise protected where they are made, they can legally
proceed without obtaining permission from the holder of the intellectual
property rights. Even after compliance with the TRIP (Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property) treaty, the breeding of new cultivars using
prior cultivars protected in developed countries may be legal under the forms
of protection being adopted in many LDCs. These cultivars and associated
genetic material might not be legally imported into countries where they are
subject to patent claims. But most of the staple food crops of importance for
LDCs are largely consumed domestically, as discussed in detail in Binenbaum
23 Because international patenting is expensive, corporations in many, if not most, cases
have not obtained patent protection beyond certain OECD countries.
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facilitate a kind of indirect market segmentation, in which LDCs get the new
technology for free, and proprietary claims are enforced in developed
countries. Further, cultivars incorporating genes patented in LDCs may not
be subject to eﬀective intellectual property claims if those countries have
neither the legal means nor the will to enforce them (Giannakas 2001).
For thenear term,research agencies in LDCsare likelyto haveconsiderable
freedom to operate, if they operate judiciously. Retroactive patenting being
impossible, most of the technology useable by the CGIAR and its LDC
partners over the next half-decade or so is likely to be unencumbered by
relevant intellectual property rights.
24 But it would be hazardous to assume
generalfreedomtooperate;mistakescouldresultincatastrophiclegalliability.
To reliably implement a strategy of obtaining intellectual property only where
necessary, those who make research commitments must have access to
adequate information on patent rights and to expert legal counsel. Such access
is not widely available at present on an international basis, and does not exist
for most LDC researchers and research institutions.
A promising initiative to provide intellectual property information services
for developing-world research organisations is being pursued by the non-
proﬁt corporation CAMBIA in Australia. The aim is to develop interactive
software that can help researchers to identify prior patent claims and identify
areas of freedom to operate and thus travel more safely through the
international patent mineﬁeld. This type of initiative requires access to
personnel with wide experience in international patenting and patent
negotiations.
Markets for intellectual property can also be segregated on grounds other
than geography. With technology licences, common segmentation strategies
include delineating ﬁelds of use (e.g., including or excluding particular crops),
length of time (e.g., renewable term or end of patent life), certain claims of a
patent, limitations to speciﬁc uses of the technology, research use versus
commercialisation, or restrictions on third-party services. Another option is
to charge licence fees based on an ability to pay or expectation of the proﬁt
streams, thus distinguishing between commercial or non-commercial uses,
24 For the CGIAR (as well as agencies in developing countries heavily reliant on donor
funding), a possible drawback of proceeding to use locally unprotected technologies is that one
motivation for developed-country donor support might be prospective spin-oﬀs of research for
farmers in their own countries (Tribe 1991). These have been shown to be very valuable for the
USA, Australia and Canada in wheat and rice (Brennan and Fox1995; Pardey et al. 1996;
Thomas 1996). To the extent that CGIAR technology is subject to intellectual property rights
in rich countries, the technologies will not be available locally without appropriate licensing.
Although such licensing might still leave them with a major share of the beneﬁts, it could
decrease the enthusiasm of developed-country donors (especially those that are not home to
holders of strong IPR in this area) for such a strategy.
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large national or multinational corporations.
Lanjouw (2001) has developed a highly creative initiative for market
segmentation of pharmaceuticals (such as drugs for global diseases like
cancer or heart disease) with large potential markets in both developed and
less-developed countries. By her proposal, (discussed in Mallaby 2001;
Phillips 2001) patent applicants in, for example, the USA would have to
commit not to enforce their patents in a designated list of developing
countries when they apply for a foreign ﬁling licence with the USA Patent
and Trade Mark Oﬃce. This licence is a routine requirement for subsequent
ﬁlings in other countries. Producers would eﬀectively be asked to choose
between enforcing their patents in developed countries or developing
countries but not both. The incentive to develop drugs for diseases that are
speciﬁc to developing countries such as anti-malarial drugs would not be
greatly aﬀected. In developed countries, this initiative would require only an
amendment to national patent legislation; no amendment of international
agreements is needed. It would be highly desirable if plant biotechnology
could be included in this initiative.
5.4 Mergers or joint ventures
As Barton (2000, p. 9) notes, [M]ergers leading to oligopoly may often be an
appropriate mechanism of avoiding a patent ﬁght – the merger is the ultimate
cross-licence. In agricultural biotech, mergers are a prime private-sector
solution, to minimise the private cost of transactions in intellectual property
used in research (see, for example, Marco and Rausser 2000.) They can also
lead to the private beneﬁts (and public costs) of monopoly. For many public
research institutions, privatisation is neither feasible nor necessarily desirable
at this time.
Joint ventures are often viewed as a more promising and ﬂexible
alternative. In 1992⁄93 the CSIRO in Australia undertook a joint research
venture with Monsanto to incorporate the company’s Bt technology into
locally adapted cotton varieties, which are being marketed through an
exclusive licensing agreement by Cotton Seed Distributors, Australia’s largest
supplier of commercial cotton seed.
5.5 Cost-free licensing of technologies
For many crops other than wheat, maize, some kinds of rice, soybeans, and
barley, private (and public) intellectual property rights holders might be
persuaded to allow International Agricultural Research Centres, and public
research agencies in developing countries, to develop proprietary biotechno-
logy for use by farmers without any direct compensation. This could be true
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are the focus of the intellectual property rights holders’ hopes for proﬁts.
Staple crops for poor consumers have low income elasticities of demand, and
most will never have large commercial markets even if poor consumers’
incomes increase. As consumers gain wealth, they will substitute more
desirable foods, including wheat and meat.
Already, there are well-publicised cases of provision of technology without
charge in these non-commercial crops, including several under the auspices of
the International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications
(ISAAA). Monsanto Corporation has made its technology available to
achieve virus resistance in several non-commercial potato cultivars popular
among the poor in Mexico (Qaim 1998). It has also supported the
incorporation of virus resistance technology in yams in Africa. AstraZeneca
(now Syngenta) and Monsanto have announced they will make technology
for the Vitamin A rice, currently under development, available gratis for
subsistence farmers (speciﬁcally, those earning less than $10 000 per year
from farming) in developing countries (Trait 2000). Such collaborations
might become increasingly attractive to corporations if international oppo-
sition to corporations that market transgenic seeds continues to grow. To
encourage private sector participation, it might be very important that ways
be found to protect the commercial provider from blame, loss of reputation,
or liability for misuse of their technology, hazards that might seem especially
serious in countries lacking eﬀective regulatory oversight.
On the other hand, it is possible that the publicity surrounding recent
technology donations could lead to an unduly sanguine assessment of
corporate generosity with respect to their intellectual property rights.
25 In the
cases referenced, it seems that few if any relevant and valid patents were
involved. For example, even though 70 patents were identiﬁed by Kryder
et al. (2000) as relevant to Vitamin A rice technology, the authors report
that none is valid in Bangladesh, Thailand, Myanmar, Iran, Nigeria, Iraq,
Saudi Arabia or Malaysia. Though some of the patents are valid in
the USA (44 patents) and Japan (21), fewer are valid in developing
countries such as China (11), Indonesia (6), India (5), Vietnam (9), and the
Philippines (1).
5.6 Direct programmatic research support from the private sector
Rather than cooperate in the piecemeal technology transfer described,
for-proﬁt corporations might be persuaded to give more general support to
25 See, for example, RAFI’s assertion that A public appeal to the company to make its
technology available to the poor will get an immediately favourable (if begrudging) response
from every Gene Giant wanting to be ‘‘Mr Nice Guy’’ in the media. (2000, p. 31)
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the part of corporations with signiﬁcant market power have already been
observed. In the genomics ﬁeld, a consortium of corporations has supported
creation of a public database of genome markers called single-nucleotide
polymorphisms (SNP), in preference to partaking in a competing private-
sector initiative (Marshall 1998a). The motivation for this type of expendi-
ture, which does not appear to be conditioned on any claim to property
rights, is not clear. But it indicates that private ﬁrms might, on occasion,
choose to support public over private research initiatives in areas comple-
mentary to their own endeavours.
Another example (discussed in a diﬀerent context above) is the involve-
ment of a foundation funded by the multinational life science corporation,
Novartis, in the support of plant biology research at the College of Natural
Resources at the University of California, Berkeley (Rausser 1999). This
support is conditioned on the right to be the ﬁrst to negotiate the rights (as
distinct from right of ﬁrst refusal of licences) to innovations arising out of
research in plant biology that is supported by the donor, and the donor also
has rights to appoint a minority of the board that directs research funded by
the Foundation (Mena and Sanders 1998). But despite prominent expressions
of concern the conditions seem surprisingly mild, given the signiﬁcant
commitment (5 years at $5 million per year), and in particular, much less
stringent than appears in typical private-sector contracts with individual
researchers.
26 Knowledgeable observers conjecture that a major portion of
the return envisaged by Novartis consists of the beneﬁts of intimate access to
the intellectual resources of the Berkeley campus.
Although, in some cases, donations could be motivated by the prospect of
taxdeductions in ex change for unused and perhaps useless technology, the
above examples suggest that it is conceivable that other corporations would
be willing to exchange access to valuable technology for close contacts with
the innovative activities and expertise of non-proﬁts, without making
demands for exclusive proprietary rights to the output. Non-proﬁts should
search for means of making this kind of transfer easy for the private sector.
But they must clearly establish the continued independence of their research
mission from undue private-sector inﬂuence. The threat of such inﬂuence is
real. Recently, disturbing (though not conclusive) new evidence appeared
regarding the bias that can be induced by private funding of research. For
example, Thomas S. Bodenheimer stated that a review of drug trials showed
that when the drug owner funded the study, the drug was highly rated in
26 For example, the Novartis Foundation get rights to ﬁrst negotiation for only a portion of
the patentable discoveries. Moreover, Novartis does not control the research done with its
support, beyond the appointment of two members of a ﬁve-person committee that decides on
allocation of the Foundation’s funds to individual projects.
Accessing other people’s technology 409




Given the proliferation of IPR associated with crop breeding and related
activities, it will increasingly be necessary to obtain freedom to operate from
multiple patentees from various countries. One way to achieve this is to
obtain a joint grant of freedom to operate in certain markets from all holders
of relevant intellectual property rights.
For more than 150 years in the USA, patent pools have been formed
either voluntarily or with the involvement of the USA Government to aﬀect
and shape industries. A patent pool is an aggregation of intellectual property
rights that are cross licensed and licensed to third parties (Clark et al. 2000).
Because of the potentiality that a patent pool can be anti-competitive, pools
are scrutinised by the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission. In 1995, these two agencies issued a set of guidelines that set
forth policies and examples of acceptable and unacceptable patent pools
(USA Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission 1995). The two
critical features of an acceptable pool are: (i) the pool integrate[s]
complementary patent rights, and (ii) the resulting competitive beneﬁts
are likely to be outweighed by competitive harm posed by other aspects of the
program.
28 Thus, patents in the pool must be essential to practice the
technology. This requirement may be too big a hurdle for agricultural
biotechnology for several reasons, not the least of which is that some very
basic and presumably blocking patents still have not been issued because
they are subject to ongoing interference proceedings in the USA Patent
and Trademark Oﬃce.
29 In any case, such joint agreement is probably
infeasible as a regular modus operandi for pooling technologies on a one-by-
one basis.
27 Likewise, Barnes and Bero (1998) examined 106 articles reviewing evidence on the eﬀects
of passive smoking and, after controlling for various other factors, showed that authors who
had a ﬁnancial aﬃliation with the tobacco industry were much more likely to conclude that
passive smoking is not harmful to health than those without industry aﬃliations. Similarly,
Stelfox et al. (1998) showed that authors who supported the use of a certain kind of drug for
treating heart ailments were signiﬁcantly more likely to have a ﬁnancial relationship with the
drug’s maker than those who did not.
28 See Letter from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice to Carey
R Ramos (June 10, 1999), available at www.usdoj.gov.
29 When there are multiple contenders for a patent to the same invention, the USA
determines who is the ﬁrst in time to have conceived the invention. In contrast, countries in
the rest of the world award a patent to the ﬁrst in time to ﬁle for a patent.
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An alternate means of lowering the cost of transactions of technology in
biotechnology is the creation of a clearinghouse. This would have the
capacity to identify relevant intellectual property in speciﬁed technology
environments, and identify its availability and how they could be accessed. It
could also establish prices or pricing indicators, facilitate negotiations and
oﬀer mechanisms for arbitration of disputes and monitoring of compliance.
An agricultural biotechnology IP clearinghouse could bundle together sets of
complementary patents from diﬀerent patent holders into complete biotech-
nology or agronomic systems contracts (thus providing upstream technology
aggregation). Through active pursuit of such syndication strategies it would
be possible to create customised licenses that could greatly increase the use of
inventors’ technologies and make multi-patent technology systems readily
available and aﬀordable to researchers (Graﬀ and Zilberman 2001).
5.9 Ally with independent developers of research tools
A quite diﬀerent approach is to sponsor creation of substitutes to existing
proprietary research paths. This is a task beyond the resources of many non-
proﬁts operating on their own (especially those operating in developing
countries). But promising collaborators do exist. For example, CAMBIA in
Australia aims to generate new biotechnology tools for agriculture, unen-
cumbered by restrictive proprietary claims. These tools are in turn made
available on an ability-to-pay basis. The licensing revenues are used to fund
further research and to support transfer of the technologies to developing
countries.
5.10 Pressing for sharing of technology
The kinds of challenges that proprietary claims pose to public-private
collaboration in biotechnology are not unique to agricultural applications,
and will take time to resolve. They belong to two broad classes. On the one
hand are issues of access to innovations useful in biotechnology, which are
shared by all other researchers in this general ﬁeld. On the other hand,
problems posed to crop breeders by farmers rights’ are similar in nature (but
not in degree) to those faced by pharmaceutical researchers interested in
access to biodiversity products. These two classes of problems require
diﬀerent approaches.
Access to research tools is a burning issue at the heart of non-proﬁt
research on biotechnology in the USA, the world leader in this area. Public
funding of biotechnology in the USA (and, indeed, scientiﬁc research funding
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Agricultural researchers might ﬁnd the report of the NIH Working Group
on Research Tools instructive (NIH 1998). The Working Group’s recom-
mendations include free dissemination of research tools where possible, use
of the Uniform Biological Materials Transfer Agreement (UBMTA),
and development of guidelines for reasonable terms of licences and MTA.
It is clear that biotechnology’s intellectual property transactions will
continue to be problematic, even when all parties are domestic and share
NIH funding.
There is a worldwide perception of the leadership of the USA in setting the
pace for the evolution of intellectual property rights. In the views of some,
the evolution has proceeded too far, for example in the patenting of gene
sequences. However, the USA Patent Oﬃce has recently responded by
increasing the utility requirement for patenting gene sequences by requiring
the applicant to identify a function for the gene (Enserink 2000). Thus,
the genome sequences determined by companies or non-proﬁt institutions
are unpatentable unless a practical use for the sequence is known. This is
not to say that the sequences will be in the public domain though,
because they can be treated as trade secrets and accessible only to those
willing to pay the going fees and agreeing to the licence terms for access
and use.
The public debates about patenting do inﬂuence patenting standards. One
form of pressure is a boycott of companies demanding unreasonable terms
for key enabling technology. This tactic, discussed by Lesser (1999) with
respect to plant breeding, would clearly be ludicrous for most non-proﬁts
(including the CGIAR) acting on their own. But this tactic appears to have
been used with some eﬀect by NIH in a protracted struggle with DuPont over
the terms of research licensing of a research tool, mice genetically engineered
with the patented cre-lox system (Marshall 1998b). Signiﬁcantly, the
compromise ultimately hammered out faciliated access to the DuPont
technology but not only excluded commercial use but also any activity
associated with higher plants or agricultural applications (NIH 1998).
Making a common cause with more powerful allies (such as NIH) in applying
pressure on holders of intellectual property might help ensure that in future
agreements, any concessions by holders of proprietary rights are extended to
international agricultural (non-proﬁt) research, and its dissemination to non-
commercial markets.
6. Conclusion
Designing policies and operating procedures to ensure suﬃcient freedom to
operate for public science is becoming increasingly important the world over.
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developed and developing world intent on developing improved seed varieties
and other technologies destined for commercial release, albeit in markets that
may generate large social gains but are not necessarily privately proﬁtable.
Various options were canvassed in this paper to improve the eﬃciency of
public-private relationships, particularly options that could lower the
transactions costs of tapping proprietary technologies for the furtherance
of public research.
Paradoxically, for developing countries the short-run importance of
freedom to operate has been exaggerated by well-publicised donations that
generate inferences that the multinational life science oligopoly holds
extensive portfolios of intellectual property that block further research in
those countries. Ironically, in developed countries non-proﬁt researchers
often believe themselves exempt from infringement suits. Worldwide,
institutions need to better understand their rights and responsibilities
regarding intellectual property.
As things stand now, intellectual property does not appear to be the
binding constraint on Southern science, but is becoming a constraint on non-
proﬁt research in rich countries. Lack of local investment in science and
limited experience and expertise in accessing, using, and regulating modern
biotechnologies are the real problems facing many countries and agencies,
especially in developing countries. Developed countries are not immune to
these problems either. As a rich country that is highly dependent on exports
to countries that have strong IP protection (e.g., USA and European
countries) but only modest investment in domestic research and develop-
ment, Australia’s agricultural biotechnology industry also suﬀers. Further-
more, the implementation of TRIPs as currently formulated will likely aﬀect
the freedom to operate in the next generation of biotechnologies. Guiding
these changes in intellectual property regimes and responding creatively to
the new environment are pressing challenges for those interested in the future
of scientiﬁc research, including agricultural biotechnology.
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